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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondent maintains that Petitioner is responsible to pay 
taxes for materials purchased by the Alpine School District 
("Alpine") and installed by Petitioner into a building constructed 
by Alpine. Despite Change Orders to the Petitioner's contract 
which specifically deleted any responsibility to furnish materials 
that were directly ordered, paid for and purchased by Alpine, the 
Respondent argues that the Petitioner had a "furnish and install 
contract" with respect to such materials. However, the only 
evidence in the record shows that Petitioner's obligations to 
furnish materials were amended by Change Order. Further, Mr. 
Dennis Cecchini, the Architect on the Project who had 
responsibility to interpret contract documents, provided the sole 
testimony with respect to the effect of the Change Orders - the 
Change Orders amended the Petitioner's contract from a "furnish 
and install" contract to an "installation only" contract. 
The Petitioner also maintains that under prior case law this 
Court is bound to impose a tax on the "consumer" of materials, that 
is, whoever last uses the materials by installing them into a 
physical structure. However, this interpretation is inconsistent 
with the Utah Supreme Court's position in Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Company v. State Tax Commission, 196 Utah Adv.Rep. 18 (Sept. 30, 
1992) which states that the alternative "consumer" analysis urged 
by Respondent applies only where the real property contractor 
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"purchases building materials11 for installation. All of the cases 
cited by the Respondent are readily distinguishable from the 
present case on the following grounds: (1) the contractor in each 
of these cases purchased and paid for the materials on which the 
sales tax was imposed whereas in this case it is undisputed that 
Alpine ordered, paid for and purchased the materials in question; 
and (2) none of the cases cited by Respondent involved a contractor 
whose contract was amended by change order to delete certain 
materials from the contract so that the contractor had no 
responsibilities other than those incident to installation with 
respect to such materials. This case is very different from the 
cases relied upon by the Respondent in this matter. 
Finally, Respondent argues that Alpine was somehow the "agentff 
of the Petitioner with respect to purchases of materials. However, 
this argument is unsupported by any evidence and none of the 
incidents of agency are present to support this wild assertion. 
IV. 
CORRECTION OF RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent has misstated and selectively asserted facts in 
this matter. The Respondent observes that the Petitioner provided 
to Alpine a list which enumerated building materials which could 
be purchased at a savings of over $1,000.00 if purchased tax free 
(Respondent Brief, p. 4) . However, the Respondent fails to note 
that the list was provided so that Alpine, a tax exempt entity, 
could determine which materials to directly purchase. Further, the 
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Respondent has simply misconstrued the relevant facts by failing 
to place them into the relevant context. The Respondent asserts 
that "Petitioner bore the burdens and risks of ownership of the 
material once it was delivered to the job site. Petitioner still 
bore the burden to furnish and install the materials under the 
contract." (Final Decision, 525, R.13). There is nothing in the 
record to support the finding that Petitioner still bore the burden 
to "furnish and install" material under the contract. The 
Respondent completely ignores the fact and effect of the Change 
Order to the Petitioner's contract which expressly removed from 
Petitioner any responsibility to furnish materials which Alpine 
determined it would order, pay for and purchase directly. 
The only contract in evidence in this matter is included in 
the Record as Exhibit "p-i" - a contract dated February 20, 1986. 
This contract did not include any of the materials for which the 
sales tax was assessed against Petitioner. The materials which 
Alpine had determined it would purchase were deleted from the 
Petitioner's contract. Further, Alpine's obligation to pay 
Petitioner for the sale price of the materials was deleted from the 
contract price. Mr. Cecchini, the Project Architect who had 
responsibility to interpret the various contract documents with 
respect to the Project, testified as an expert witness that the 
signing of this amended contract (the "Change Order") had the same 
effect as a change order (Tr. 138-139, 157.) Mr. Cecchini further 
explained that the Change Order to the Contract removed all 
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responsibility from the Petitioner with respect to furnishing any 
of the materials that would be directly purchased by the Alpine. 
The Petitionees only responsibility as a result of the Change 
Order was to install the materials purchased by Alpine (Tr. 138-
139, 144, 154-155, 160, 175.) The only testimony in the entire 
record as to the effect of the Change Order was provided by the 
Petitioner. This testimony establishes that the Petitioner's 
"furnish and install contract" was amended to an "installation 
only" contract with respect to materials purchased by Alpine. As 
a result of the Change Order, Alpine retained the administrative, 
supervisory and purchasing functions of the General Contractor with 
respect to such materials (Add. 52, 59-62, 67-68, Tr. 25-26, 74-
76, 81, 95, 135-141, 163, 172; Holden Depo. at 10-16; Finding of 




A. AN AMENDMENT DELETING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO 
FURNISH MATERIALS TO BE PURCHASED DIRECTLY BY A 
TAX EXEMPT ENTITY QUALIFIES FOR THE SALES TAX 
EXEMPTION 
1. The Tax Commissions Findings with Respect to Contract 
Interpretation are Reviewed for Correction of Error. 
The Respondent claims that the Tax Commission's findings are 
entitled to deference. However, the Tax Commission's findings 
ignore the only evidence in the record with respect to the Change 
*See Addendum 1 attached hereto and by this referenced made a part hereof. 
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Order and its effect as to interpretation of the scope of duties 
of the Petitioner. The Tax Commission relies primarily upon its 
interpretation of the agreements of the parties as the basis for 
its finding. (See Rec. 20-25, 55 15-22) However, it is well 
established under Utah law that interpretation of contract is a 
question of law. Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983). The Commission's finding 
based on interpretation of the contract documents is therefore 
entitled to no deference and should be reviewed de novo by this 
Court. 
Further, the Petitioner's argument that the "Petitioner still 
bore the burden to furnish and install the materials under the 
contract" notwithstanding the Change Order is unsupported by any 
evidence at all in the record. The Respondent cites the Tax 
Commission's Findings to establish that the Change Order did not 
alter Petitioner's obligations from a "furnish and install" to an 
"installation only" contract. (See Respondent's Brief at 5.) 
However, the Tax Commission's finding is an erroneous legal 
conclusion as to the effect of the Change Order as executed by the 
parties. The Tax Commission found: "the Change Orders which were 
executed did not relieve the Petitioner of its duty to furnish 
materials, so the contract remained a furnish and install 
contract." (R. 12, f25) This Finding is not based upon any 
evidence in the record. Further, the sole evidence in the record 
with respect to the effect of the Change Order expressly supports 
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the opposite conclusion: the Change Order deleted from Petitioner's 
contract any duties with respect to materials other than to install 
them into Alpine's building and duties attendant thereto. The Tax 
Commission's finding is not entitled to any deference because: (1) 
it constitutes a legal conclusion which interprets the legal effect 
of change orders; (2) there is absolutely no evidence in the record 
as to the effect of the Change Order was to support this 
conclusion; (3) the sole evidence in the record provided by Mr. 
Dennis Cecchini who is an expert with respect to interpretation of 
construction agreements and is expressly to the contrary. 
2. Tax Exempt Owners Who Employ Change Orders to 
Directly Purchase Materials Qualify for Tax 
Exemption. 
As the Tax Commission stated in its final decision in this 
matter, if an exempt owner purchases and installs materials itself, 
there is no question that the purchase is exempt from Sales tax. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2), (8). (Final Decision, R. 13-14, fl3) 
Moreover, if an exempt entity purchases materials and then enters 
a contract with a contractor to install the materials, again, no 
sales tax is imposed on the purchase. Id. 
There should also be no sales tax incident to an exempt 
entity's purchase of materials in a situation where the entity 
contracts with a contractor to furnish materials but then elects, 
through execution of a change order to the contract, to purchase 
materials itself and then deduct the cost of the materials and 
related sales tax from the original contract bid. The effect of 
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executing a change order is a critical point that should be given 
much more weight than that given by the Tax Commission. 
The Change Order completely altered the legal relationship 
between the parties and cannot be underestimated in determining the 
outcome of this case. Prior to executing the Change Order, Alpine 
looked to the Contractor to furnish materials and install them in 
a completed project. The execution of the Change Order, however, 
changed the legal arrangement between the parties as follows: 
(1) The Petitioner no longer is responsible to purchase the 
materials listed on the Change Order; 
(2) The bid price is reduced by the cost of the materials plus 
sales tax thereon; 
(3) Alpine is now the purchaser of the materials; 
(4) Provisions in the contract imposing various duties on the 
Contractor for materials the Contract otherwise would have 
furnished are no longer applicable and legally cannot be relied on 
by Alpine against the Contractor; 
(5) The risks and responsibilities of Alpine have been 
materially expanded in many ways (See Also Part A(4) below). 
Legally and practically, an exempt entity's purchases through 
change order are the same as purchases made directly. However, the 
Tax Commission has chosen to make a distinction between the two and 
impose stringent rules upon change order purchases. The Tax 
Commission's stance is unfortunate because the form of a 
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transaction should not affect the taxable results, so long as the 
substance is present. 
3. Imposing Contractual Duties and Responsibilities on 
Contractors as to Goods Purchased by Exempt Owners Does Not 
Affect the Tax Exempt Status of a Sale. 
The Tax Commission has expressed concern about contracts that 
impose on contractors duties related to materials purchased and 
furnished by exempt owners, such as agreement in advance with a 
contractor to perform ordering, receiving, handling, securing and 
similar duties in connection with the materials. The Tax 
Commission has indicated that these contractual duties may deprive 
an exempt owner's purchases of materials from sales tax exempt 
status. (Final Order, R. 20) In modern day construction practice, 
however, not only are exempt owners prudent in seeking help from 
parties with greater construction expertise and resources, but 
exempt owners could also be dangerously exposed absent contractors 
assuming such contractual duties. If a contractor defectively 
installs materials furnished by an exempt owner, absent contractual 
language protecting the exempt owner, the contractor may be able 
to shift the responsibility back to the owner. 
Contractual provisions requiring some delegated contractor 
accountability for proper care and use of owner-furnished materials 
attempt to ensure that the contractor will perform its duties to 
install owner-furnished materials as responsibly and carefully as 
with materials furnished and consumed by the contractor. These 
contractual provisions, however, are not intended to remove from 
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the exempt owner the risks, prerogatives and responsibilities of 
owning the materials. For example, Alpine expressly assumes the 
responsibilities and risks associated with ordering, insuring the 
correct number, quality and timely delivery of materials to the 
Project site. (Tr. 140-141,) These duties Petitioner had prior 
to the Change Order. 
Also, in many cases involving exempt owner purchasers, 
contract provisions meant to cover contractor-furnished materials 
are not intended to apply to exempt-owner furnished materials, 
based on change orders between the parties and the express conduct 
of the parties which further modifies their written contract, 
particularly if that conduct extends over long periods of time. 
A leading treatise on Contracts states: 
[Innumerable cases show that the fact that a contract 
has been put into express words does not prevent the 
meaning and legal operation of those words from being 
affected by process of ximplication1 from the conduct of 
the parties and from surrounding circumstances . . . A 
promisor, even though his promise has been put into clear 
words, can always add to it, modify it or wholly replace 
it by a subsequent tacit agreement, one in which his own 
promises are found wholly by inference from conduct other 
than words. 
Corbin on Contracts § 564 (3d ed. 1979). 
This Court has espoused this doctrine. In Eie v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981), the Court 
stated: 
Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties 
demonstrate by their actions that to them the contract 
meant something quite different, the intent of the 
parties will be enforced. 
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See also Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965); and 
Bullfrog Marina v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972). 
An exempt owner cannot claim exemption from sales tax when it 
in substance is not the purchaser and owner of materials, and in 
effect has merely taken steps to give the appearance of ownership 
without assuming the requisite risk of loss. However, there should 
be a balance. Although an exempt owner must possess sufficient 
benefits and burdens to be deemed owner and consumer of the 
construction materials, the Tax Commission must be objective in 
recognizing those benefits and burdens before dismissing them as 
a mere "paper trail." 
A fair and workable interpretation of the exemption statute 
would require that exempt owners demonstrate that they are owners 
and consumers of the materials for which no sales tax is paid. A 
rebuttable presumption of ownership and consumption should be made 
when (1) the contract between the exempt owner and the contractor 
authorizes an otherwise furnish-and-install contract to be amended 
by change order, (2) the exempt owner executes change orders to 
reflect the materials purchased, and (3) the exempt owner executes 
purchase orders and checks for payment on its own stationary and 
in its own name. 
4. Whenever an Owner Becomes the Direct Purchaser of Materials, 
the Relative Legal Duties of the Owner, Contractor and Seller 
are Changed. 
Whenever an owner purchases materials for a construction 
project by executing purchase orders and signing checks, the legal 
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relationships of the parties to the transaction are dramatically 
changed. The owner steps into privity of contract with the 
supplier and at the same time, the contractor ceases to be in 
privity with the supplier. 
The following are some examples of the potential impact of 
these changes. The Uniform Commercial Code may not apply to the 
contract between the contractor and the owner, because the 
contractor's obligation will no longer include the purchased goods. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-210 (1990) (UCC applies to transactions 
in goods).2 Thus, a whole array of express and implied warranties 
may no longer apply in the relationship between the exempt owner 
and contractors. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-313, -314 and -315 
(1990) (express and implied warranties under UCC). At the same 
time, as buyer, the exempt owner will have those warranty rights 
in relationship to the supplier of goods. 
Counteracting these newly gained rights, an owner who becomes 
a buyer loses rights under the UCC upon accepting the goods. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602. Furthermore, by becoming a direct 
purchaser, the owner may waive other contract rights. By giving 
up (through change order or otherwise) the contract right to have 
the contractor purchase building materials, the owner may impliedly 
2The Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, held that the UCC applied to a construction contract involving 
the supply of materials. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp, 451 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 
1971); accord Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co. 532 F.2d 572, 579-82 (7th Cir. 
1976); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957-60 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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waive legal claims or defenses — or be held to be partially 
responsible under Utah's comparative negligence statute should the 
purchased product fail or cause harm. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
27-37, -38, -40 and -43 (1986). 
In sum, when an owner buys its own building materials, that 
transaction has legal significance. To dismiss such involvement 
as a mere "paper trail" is to ignore the array of legal rights and 
duties existing between owners, contractors and suppliers in 
building construction. 
B. THE IDENTITY OF THE PURCHASER CONTROLS ENTITLEMENT 
TO TAX EXEMPT STATUS UNDER UTAH STATUTES. 
The Respondent argues that it is not sufficient to identify 
the purchaser of the materials; rather, if a contractor is involved 
at any stage in actually physically placing materials into a 
physical structure, then the contractor has "used" those materials 
and the contractor must be deemed to be the "consumer" of the 
materials and therefore the person responsible to pay the tax 
therefor. (Respondent's Brief, 10-12.) However, if Respondent's 
line of reasoning were adopted, then the contractor would remain 
responsible even if it merely installs materials into a physical 
structure under an "installation only" contract. Indeed, a tax 
exempt entity could never qualify for a tax exemption unless the 
tax exempt entities' own employees acted as the General Contractor 
who directly installed the materials into physical facilities 
without using any subcontractors to perform the work. The State 
Tax Code simply does not require such extreme measures to qualify 
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for the sales tax exemption. Rather, the state sales tax imposes 
the burden of tax upon the "purchaser" of the material. If the 
purchaser is a tax exempt entity then the sales tax is not owed 
under UCA §59-12-104(2). 
The Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Company v. State Tax Commission, 196 Utah Adv.Rep. 18 (Sept. 
30, 1992) is instructive as to the identity of the taxable event 
and the entity to be taxed for sales tax. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Sales taxes are imposed on retail sales of tangible 
personal property that take place in Utah. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-14-4(a) (Supp. 1984 & Supp. 1985). Use taxes 
are imposed on the storage, use, or consumption of 
tangible personal property purchased outside the state 
for storage, use or consumption in Utah. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985). 
When purchasing raw materials, a manufacturer does not 
engage in a retail sales transaction. The theory of the 
statutory scheme is that tangible personal property used 
in manufacturing or fabrication should be taxed once, and 
only once. That one-time taxable event occurs when the 
sales tax is levied on the price of the finished product 
sold at retail, since the value of the component parts is 
included in that price. 
However, when tangible personal property is sold for 
incorporation into real property, as opposed to another 
item of personal property, different rules apply. For 
example, one who purchases building materials for use in 
constructing homes, highways and the like, is a xreal 
property contractor,' and the contractor's purchases of 
tangible personal property used for such purposes are 
taxable transactions under sales tax law. (citations 
omitted.) In effect, a real property contractor is 
treated as a consumer for sales tax purposes. 
The reason for this rule is that materials which are 
purchased and then converted into real property would 
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escape the sales tax because sales tax is not imposed on 
the sale of real property. Real property contractors are 
therefore considered the consumers because their 
purchases of materials that are incorporated into real 
property are the last transactions in which the materials 
can be subjected to the sales tax. 
Id. 19-2 0. 
It is important to note that the "taxable event" defined by 
the Utah Supreme Court is the "real property contractor's purchase" 
of building materials "on the price of the product sold at retail." 
Id at 19. The tax falls on the person "who purchases building 
materials." Id. at 20. It follows that if the purchase is made 
by a tax exempt entity rather than a real property contractor, the 
taxable event is exempt from the sales tax. The Court's entire 
analysis emphasizes the identity of the purchaser of the materials. 
The alternative rule which deems a real property contractor to be 
the "consumer" does not come into effect unless the contractor 
purchases the materials for incorporation into a structure. 
This position is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's 
statement in Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 
Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408, 411 (1942) wherein the Court stated: 
It is true that under this section sales made directly by 
plaintiffs to the state would be exempted, but in the 
instant case the sales are to an independent contractor 
and not to an agent of the state. 
Rule 865-19-585(4) also provides that sales of materials to 
tax exempt institutions are exempt if sold as tangible personal 
property and the material supplier does not install the materials 
as improvements to realty. If the exempt entity purchases 
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materials and the seller does not install them, no sales tax is 
due. 
The Respondent relies upon Hardy v. State Tax Commission, 561 
P.2d 1064, 1054 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that sales tax 
"should be paid on the sale of any personal property in the state 
somewhere along the line between its production and consumption.11 
(Res. Brief, 10) However, this assertion, without qualification, 
simply assumes that no tax exemption applies and that a state tax 
sale must be paid somewhere along the line between purchase and 
installation into a physical structure. However, the Hardy v. 
State Tax Commission case is readily distinguishable from the 
present case because Hardy did not deal with a situation where a 
tax exempt entity directly purchased the materials and delivered 
the materials to a subcontractor for installation into a physical 
structure. 
The Respondent relies upon Utah Concrete Products, v. State 
Tax Commission, 101 Ut. 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); and Olsen 
Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 12 Ut.2d 42, 361 P.2d 
1112 (1961) for the assertion that tax liability falls upon the 
contractor who is deemed to be the f•ultimate consumer.f' Such a 
rule may be applicable to situations where the contractor actually 
purchases the materials in question and installs them into a 
physical structure. However, such a rule does not apply where the 
tax exempt entity purchases the materials. Where a tax exempt 
entity hires a subcontractor to install materials which the tax 
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exempt entity has purchased, the tax exempt entity is the 
"purchaser" and the "ultimate consumer" within the meaning of the 
tax exemption for sales tax purposes. 
The Respondent relies especially upon Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Ut. 1990), wherein a Utah 
Building Contractor who actually purchased items of tangible 
personal property and sent the items out of state to be installed 
into physical structures was held liable for the Utah sales tax. 
The Court correctly held that the tax was due on the "sale" of the 
property in Utah to the party who ultimately installed the property 
to property located outside of Utah. However, the facts of the 
Tummurru matter are very different from the present case. In the 
present case, Alpine (not Petitioner) purchased the materials in 
question. Unlike the contractor in Tummurru, Alpine and not 
Petitioner ordered, received and directly paid for the materials 
that were placed into the School District's building. The use tax 
does not apply in this case for the reasons set forth in 
Petitioner's Brief and to which Respondent has failed entirely to 
respond. (See Petitioner's Brief, 28-30) Because the non-exempt 
contractor in Tummurru purchased, took possession of the materials 
in the State of Utah and later installed them to real property, the 
sales were not tax exempt even though the conversion to real 
property occurred out of state. Had an exempt entity such as 
Alpine been the purchaser in Tummurru, no sales tax would have been 
due. 
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The Respondent holds that the "ultimate consumer" is the 
entity responsible for the tax. (Respondent's Brief at 12.) The 
Respondent defines an "ultimate consumer" to be that person or 
entity which ultimately places the materials into a physical 
structure. However, this position is inconsistent event with the 
Tax Commission's own rules which expressly provide that an 
"installation only" contractor is not responsible for sales tax 
where the owner is a tax exempt entity. The Respondent's position 
is therefore incoherent. Indeed, the Respondent's position is 
inconsistent even with the Tax Commission's position. The 
Respondent's analysis would make any person or entity who 
physically places materials into a structure to be the entity 
subject to sales tax. However, the Tax Commission has expressly 
and by rule recognized that the tax should not be imposed where the 
tax exempt entity controls the purchase of the materials and merely 
hires out the installation of the materials. See Rule R865-19-
58SA.4. That is precisely what Alpine has done in this case with 
respect to the Petitioner. Thus, the "transactional analysis" in 
which Respondent engages is inconsistent with both statute and the 
Tax Commission's rules. 
The Respondent admits that the tax may not have been "due when 
the materials were acquired," yet the Respondent maintains that 
"there was a subsequent taxable event; the use, storage and 
consumption of the material by the Petitioner." (Respondent's 
Brief at 14). However, if the mere taking possession of materials 
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after delivery to the construction site constitutes a "taxable 
event," then even installation only contracts will be subject to 
the state sales tax. The Project Architect, Mr. Dennis Cecchini 
testified that all installation only contractors must take 
possession and control of materials during the time they are being 
used to be incorporated into a physical structure pursuant to the 
installation only contract. (Tr. at 139-140)3 Both the Tax 
Commission and the Respondent have simply ignored the effect of the 
Change Order to the Petitioner's contract with respect to the 
Petitioner's scope of responsibilities. The effect was to remove 
from the Petitioner's contract any responsibility to order and 
coordinate timely delivery of the proper number and quantity of 
materials that were to be purchased directly by Alpine. The only 
responsibilities retained by the Petitioner included taking 
possession of the materials once delivered to the site for purposes 
of installation into the school building. All of the duties 
undertaken by the Petitioner with respect to owner purchased 
materials were consistent with the Petitioner having an 
"installation only" contract. Under the Tax Commission's rules and 
interpretation of the statute, such an installation only contract 
does not subject the Petitioner to the state sales tax; rather, the 
purchasing tax exempt entity is deemed to be the "purchaser" and 
the sales tax exemption is available to such an entity. The 
3See Addendum 3 attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
- 18 -
Petitioner does not become a "consumer" merely because he installs 
material into a physical structure. 
C. THE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT ACT AS 
PETITIONER'S AGENT WHEN PURCHASING MATERIALS 
In a rather desperate attempt to escape the exemption from 
sales tax where an exempt entity is the actual purchaser of the 
material, the Respondent asserts that Alpine "was Petitioner's 
purchasing agent." The claim that Alpine purchased materials as 
an agent at least constitutes an admission that Alpine purchased 
the materials. (Respondents Brief at p. 22.) Further, such a 
legal conclusion does not square with the facts. An agency 
relationship can exist only where the principal exercises control 
over the agent. Zions First National Bank v. National American 
Title Insurance, 749 P.2 651, 654 (Utah 1988). There was never any 
contractual agreement between Petitioner and Alpine; rather 
Petitioner contracted as a subcontractor only with Poulsen-
Ellsworth Construction Company, the general contractor on the job. 
(Tr. 33-34) Alpine, not the Petitioner, controlled ordering 
materials, determining the appropriate quantity, quality, place and 
time for delivery. The Alpine School District, not the Petitioner, 
decided in its sole discretion which materials it would directly 
purchase using its own funds. (Stipulated Fact 12, Add. 42; 
Finding of Fact 3-4, 8; Add. 2-5; 52, 59-62, 67-68; Tr. 25-26, 74-
76, 81, 95, 135-141, 163, 172.) The Petitioner had absolutely no 
role or say in the design, the budget, the scope, the materials 
called for in the plans and specifications, or the critical path 
- 19 -
(time table) of the Project. Only Dr. Jacklin could authorize 
payment of materials by the School District (Stipulated Facts, 
533) . There is no evidence in the record even remotely suggesting 
that Petitioner had authority to bind Alpine with respect to any 
particular supplier or materials to be purchased. Specifically, 
the Tax Commission found: 
Dr. Jacklin visited the project site in the accompany of 
the project architect at least weekly during the 
construction period. He was ultimately responsible to 
authorize the issuance of purchase orders for 
construction materials on behalf of the School District. 
Mr. Sherm Wankier, the Purchasing Agent and an employee 
of the School District, was directly responsible to fill 
out purchase orders on behalf of the School District and 
to sent them to suppliers of materials for the project. 
(R. 12, f21 of Final Findings). 
Thus, the Tax Commission recognized that Alpine employees Dr. 
Jacklin and Sherm Wankier had ultimate responsibility with respect 
to authorization of purchase of construction materials and payment 
therefore. The Tax Commission recognized Mr. Sherm Wankier as the 
purchasing agent on the Project. The Respondent's position is 
contradicted by the Tax Commission's findings in this case. 
The Petitioner never authorized Alpine to act on his behalf; 
rather, Alpine determined in its sole discretion to authorize the 
Change Order which changed the scope of Petitioner's contractual 
duties to Alpine on the Project. Alpine controlled the entire 
purchasing process by determining which materials would be 
purchased, filling out purchase orders for such materials, 
inspecting them upon receipt, and making checks directly paid to 
the material supplier. The only role Petitioner had in the entire 
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project with respect to owner purchased materials was to take 
possession of them and install them into the physical structure. 
No other reading of the contract is consistent with the Change 
Order removing the materials to be purchased by Alpine. Because any 
responsibility to furnish the Alpine purchased materials was 
deleted from the contract under the amendment, there is no 
possibility that Petitioner nevertheless had responsibility to 
direct Alpine's performance with respect to such purchases.4 
There is nothing in Alpine's purchasing activity which 
suggests that it acted as Petitioner's "purchasing agent." The 
procedure for purchasing materials which were to be purchased 
directly by Alpine was set up and established solely by Alpine. 
Petitioner had no input or involvement in that decision. Once 
Alpine made the determination to purchase certain materials, Alpine 
issued the Change Order for such materials and the purchase price 
of the materials together with the sales tax thereon was deleted 
from the Petitioner's subcontract. Alpine, through Dr. Jacklin, 
would then authorize Mr. Sherm Wankier, an employee of Alpine 
School District and the School District's chief Purchasing Agent, 
to execute a purchase order to be sent to the material supplier. 
Alpine undertook responsibility to order the materials, made sure 
the correct quantities were ordered and that the materials were 
delivered in conformance with the critical path schedule (Tr. 14 0-
141) . The material supplier would then deliver the materials to 
4See Addendum 4 Attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
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the Project site and not to the Petitioner. After the delivery, 
the Petitioner in company with Alpine's Employees Dr. Jacklin and 
Mr. Holden identified the relevant materials so that there would 
be no question as to whether the materials were delivered without 
damage. (Tr. 140.) When Dr. Jacklin determined that the proper 
materials had been delivered without damage, Dr. Jacklin would then 
authorize Alpine to issue a check for payment of the materials. 
Mr. Greg Holbrook, another employee of the School District then 
issued an Alpine check directly to the material supplier to pay for 
the materials. The materials were then delivered to Petitioner's 
care to be installed into the structure. (See Stipulated Facts, 
R. 212-215, No. 306, 11-12, 25-33; Add. 40, 42, 46; Findings of 
Fact 10, 18-20; Add 5-7; Tr. at 66-78, 131-132, 146; Holden Depo. , 
in Record as P-7, at 3-16.) There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that these Alpine employees worked at the direction of the 




The facts of this case establish that the Petitioner's 
contract was subject to Change Order. There is no question that 
the Change Order was actually made to Petitioner's contract and all 
materials that Alpine School District had elected to directly 
purchase were deleted from the scope of Petitioner's 
responsibilities to "furnish." The initial contract entered into 
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between the Petitioner and the General Contractor on the Project, 
Poulsen-Ellsworth Construction Company, was superseded by a second 
written agreement which did not include materials that would be 
purchased by Alpine. The materials which would be purchased by 
Alpine were simply removed and deducted from the contract except 
with respect to paragraph J, paragraph 2 0 of the Supplementary 
Conditions providing for "Direct Purchases by School District.11 
The Tax Commission's legal conclusion that Petitioner remained 
responsible to furnish materials that would be purchased by the 
School District despite the Change Order to the Petitioner's 
contract is unsupported by any evidence. This bare legal 
conclusion of the Tax Commission is contrary to law and the 
testimony of the Project Engineer, Mr. Dennis Cecchini, who 
testified that the changes resulted in the Petitioner having an 
"installation only" contract. 
None of the cases cited by the Respondent apply to this case 
because they are distinguishable with respect to these critical 
facts: (1) in each of the cases cited by the Respondent, the 
contractor, not the tax exempt entity, was the actual purchaser of 
the materials in question; (2) in each of the cases cited by the 
Respondent there were no Change Orders to the Contractor's 
agreement which removed responsibility to purchase materials that 
would be purchased by the tax exempt entity; and (3) none of the 
cases cited by Respondent dealt with contractors who had 
"installation only" contracts. 
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The identity of the purchaser of the materials determines 
whether the sales tax exemption is available to Alpine. In Chicago 
Bridge & Iron Company, supra, the Utah Supreme Court observed that 
the key taxable event is a purchase of materials by a real property 
contractor for later installation. The Petitioner did not purchase 
the materials for which the sales tax has been assessed, rather, 
the materials were purchased by Alpine. Therefore, Petitioner is 
not the responsible entity for the tax. 
The Respondent's assertion that Alpine became the Petitioner's 
"purchasing agent" is not supported by anything in the record. 
First, there was not even a contractual agreement between 
Petitioner and Alpine. Further, Alpine maintained control with 
respect to the materials that would be purchased, filled out 
purchase orders for purchase of the materials, delivered checks to 
material suppliers and dealt directly with all material suppliers. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record which indicates that 
Alpine took orders from the Petitioner with respect to purchase of 
materials. The mere fact that the Petitioner inspected materials 
upon receipt in company with Alpine's employees does not create an 
agency relcttionship. 
Finally, the Respondent has failed entirely to address the 
Petitioner's argument that the Tax Commission violated the state 
statute and the Utah Constitution by imposing a tax on Alpine 
School District as a tax exempt entity. The Respondent has simply 
ignored Petitioner's argument that the Tax Commission in effect 
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redirects tax monies back to the general fund for redistribution 
and away from the entity intended by the Legislature in violation 
of the Utah Constitution, Article VI, §1, Article X, §§1 and 5; 
Article XIII, §12(3) and U.CA. § 53A-16-101 (Add. 153-158). 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the 
decision of the Tax Commission and order that Alpine's purchases 
of school construction materials are tax exempt. 
DATED this 30*** day of October, 1992. 
Respectfully Submitted 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Brintori R. Burl on  bidge 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Blake T. Ostler 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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